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ABSTRACT 
The market discipline is considered an important element for creating a sound and efficient operation of 
the banking industry. It can be shown by the response of investors and depositors of the business opera-
tions and management in relation to the risk of a bank. Theoretically, there are hypotheses must be ac-
complished in order to effectively market discipline occurs. The first hypothesis, whether the market 
discipline provides a signal for of banks regarding the existence of a certain conditions which is incon-
sistent with sound and efficient bank and business operation (Disciplining Signal Hypotheses; DSH). 
The second, bank management will respond to the signal by making efforts towards the implementation 
for correction on the business in line with expectations (Corrective Response Hypotheses; CRH). The 
verification used the empirical accounting data and market commercial banks with a total of 110 fre-
quency of semester 2000-2010 (panel data, 1843 observations). Empirical analysis model used regres-
sion panel data. The estimation results indicate that DSH gained strong empirical support. On the other 
hand, the result of estimation involved in CRH is still significantly weak. This indicates that the market 
discipline mechanism has not operated optimally in Indonesian banking industries. Therefore, correc-
tion is required especially on regulatory mechanisms to improve the quality of banking. 
 
Key words: Market Discipline, Banking, Disciplining Signal Hypotheses, Corrective Response 
Hypotheses. 
 
ANALISIS MEKANISME DISPLIN PASAR PADA INDUSTRI PERBANKAN 
INDONESIA 
ABSTRAK 
Disiplin pasar adalah suatu elemen penting dalam mewujudkan operasional industri perbankan yang 
sehat dan efisien. Disiplin pasar ditunjukkan dengan respon para investor dan deposan terhadap 
penyelenggaraan bisnis dan pengelolaan risiko suatu bank. Secara teoritis terdapat dua hipotesis 
yang harus terpenuhi agar disiplin pasar terjadi secara efektif. Hipotesis pertama, adalah disiplin 
pasar memberikan sinyal kepada bank akan adanya suatu sistuasi/kondisi yang tidak sesuai dengan 
pelaksanaan bisnis bank yang sehat dan efisien (Disciplining Signal Hypotheses; DSH). Kedua, 
manajemen bank akan merespon sinyal dengan melakukan upaya korektif terhadap pelaksanaan 
bisnis agar kembali sesuai dengan harapan (Corrective Response Hypotheses; CRH). Desain verifi-
kasi empiris menggunakan data akuntansi dan pasar bank umum sebanyak 110 frekuensi semester 
pada periode 2000-2010 (data panel, 1843 observasi). Model analisis empiris adalah regresi panel 
data. Hasil estimasi menunjukkan bahwa DSH memperoleh dukungan empiris yang cukup kuat. Di 
sisi lain hasil estimasi pada CRH terlibat lebih lemah secara signifikan. Kondisi ini menunjukkan 
bahwa mekanisme disiplin pasar belum bekerja secara optimal pada industri perbankan Indonesia. 
Perbaikan terutama mekanisme regulasi perlu dilakukan untuk meningkatkan kualitas perbankan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Market Discipline, Banking, Disciplining Signal Hypotheses, Corrective Response 
Hypotheses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic performance and fiscal costs 
which are weakening are identified by the 
costs incurred by the failure of the banking 
system crisis. Dell Arricia et al. (2004), 
Kliengebiel et al. (2005) and Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) conducted a study on the 
documentation and some of banking crises 
that occurred in different parts of the world. 
They found that the cost of the banking cri-
sis might reach 40% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and economic contraction 
that occurs could reach 15% around the peak 
of the crisis. 
For that reason, it is thus not surprising 
that the authorities in various parts of the 
world are working to develop regulations to 
address this issue. One of the major advances 
is the Basel II framework. Such framework is 
designed in order to build a sound and pru-
dent banking industry. This was initiated by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
in 2006. Actually, Basel II has three pillars 
principles of bank supervision and regulation 
effective. These three pillars are (1) capital 
requirements, (2) the effective supervision, 
and (3) market discipline. 
In this study, the researcher will conduct 
a disciplinary investigation into the imple-
mentation of market mechanisms especially 
in the context of the banking industries in 
Indonesia. In line with the spirit of Basel II, 
the researcher believes that investors and the 
public have a vital role in maintaining the 
continuity of banking that is based on sound 
commercial principles. The existence of in-
herent and responsive control that is market 
discipline is essential for the implementation 
of prudent bank business (Lane 1993). 
In addition, market discipline works 
primarily through signaling (Flannery 2001). 
In this case, there are two canals in which 
the public and investors can respond to poli-
cies that is deviated by a bank. The canal is 
the stock price and interest rates on deposits 
(deposits, savings and current accounts). 
Later on, the researcher investigates the 
mechanism of implementation of market 
discipline by the bank. Analysis is per-
formed in two stages. In the first stage the 
authors propose proposition that stock prices 
and interest rates contain information about 
aspects of the discipline by the market. 
Community and investors will be to sell and/ 
or reduce placements in bank deposits that 
are perceived as risky. In line with Flannery 
(2001), the researcher refers to this as the 
preposition market discipline hypothesis 
signal (signal disciplining hypotheses). 
 In the second stage, the researcher at-
tempts to reveal the hypothesis that there is 
information related discipline on stocks and 
interest rates will encourage bank manage-
ment to take remedial action. In other words, 
after experiencing pressure from the public 
and investors (through the fall of stock 
prices and/or interest rate spike), the man-
agement of the bank will attempt to improve 
financial performance. The researcher calls 
this proposition as a corrective response hy-
pothesis. 
The researcher uses a proxy variable of 
market discipline and control variables. The 
empirical acceptance of the existence of 
market discipline and the signal hypothesis 
corrective response will be interpreted as an 
endorsement of the existence of market dis-
cipline mechanism. The market gave a nega-
tive signal in response to the actions or poli-
cies that deviate from bank management. 
Bank management will pay attention to this 
signal and implement actions or policies 
necessary to restore market perception. 
In reference to the various aspects 
above, the problems can be formulated in 
two research questions as the following. 
1. Whether public and investors can identify 
the position of a bank risk reasonably risk 
and provide adequate signal. 
2. Whether bank management pays attention 
to the signals and provides a response in the 
form of policies to improve public percep-
tions of risk and investors. 
Based on such research question, the ob-
jectives to be achieved are as follows: 
1. To see how the public and investors can 
identify the position of a bank's risk appro-
priately and provide adequate signal; 
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2. To provide a discourse in policy making 
for improving the public perception of risk 
and investors in banking industries in Indo-
nesia. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is noted that there are various conceptions 
and definitions of a bank. A bank is described 
as an institution consisting of current opera-
tions in granting loans and receiving deposits 
from the public (Freixas and Rochet 2008, p. 
1). In carrying out the functions mentioned 
above, the bank can not be separated from the 
potential risks. There are many potential risks 
that are relevant in bank operations. How-
ever, with the Basel II framework, this fo-
cuses on credit risk, market risk, and opera-
tional risk (Apostolic 2009). 
The exposure to risk is inevitable in bank-
ing business. Like other business, the main 
issue here is the trade off of risk versus yield 
and positioning on the risk efficient frontier 
(Sinkey 2002, p. 78). With a certain degree of 
risk preferences, the bank's management seeks 
to achieve maximum benefit and most effi-
cient risk mitigation obtained through: preven-
tion and resolution (Sinkey 2002, p 79). How 
business process optimization with the bank's 
risk preference constraints is the topic to be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Bank Risk Taking Behavior 
The analysis is based on bank risk-taking 
behavior on Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), which is standard equipment 
commonly used in the discipline of invest-
ment allocation theory. Assumptions used 
are as follows: 
1. The Bank has conservative risk prefer-
ences (risk averse); 
2. There is a universe of investment options 
with relationship and positive risk yields 
a positive (not necessarily linear); 
3. The correlation between investment op-
tions is not perfect (-1 <r <1; r is the cor-
relation coefficient) and thus can be used 
to create a diversified portfolio with less 
risk of lower than individual assets; 
4. The bank managers have rational charac-
teristics, seeking to maximize profit 
based on resource constraints and risk 
preferences they have. 
Figure 1 reflects a conceptual overview 
of the process optimization portfolio mix 
that will maximize returns for a given level 
of risk. Some conventions regarding notation 
can be described as the following. 
1. There are two investment options such as 
Deposits (D) and loans (L), with a nu-
merical notation of each number xD and 
xL as well and for yields. 
2. There is a risk-free asset yield of r. 
3. Bank has a number of W initial re-
sources to be allocated in D and L. 
4. The yield of each asset is determined in a 
competitive market. 
Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffe (1974) 
show the returns on risk-free assets is be-
Figure 1 
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tween yields on deposits and loans as well as 
the correlation between the yields on deposits 
and loans is positive then the bank will per-
form optimization at point C. Here the ank 
will mobilize savings for investment to rC 
and rB loan and the risk-free asset for BC. 
Conversely, if the risk-free asset yields 
bring about savings and loan, the bank will 
do the optimization at level A. Here the bank 
will sell the risk-free asset. Or, in other 
words, the bank will borrow funds and in-
vest it in the savings and loan. Bank will sell 
the risk-free asset for rB and rA invest the 
loan and deposits AB. 
Analytically, this condition can be 
shown as follows: 
a. Bank maximizes the objective function 
  (1) 
in which: 
 (2) 
b. In the first condition, Maximization order 
condition is given as 
 (3) 
in which: 
 
  (4) 
 
 
  (5) 
 
From the first order condition, by the 
equation 4 and 5, it can be derived the 
prepositions as the following: 
Preposition 1 
If and then x rrrD ~~ <<  and 0)~,~cov( >LD rr  
then x*L>0 and x*D>0. 
Preposition 2 
x*L is the function increased towards the 
variable )~( rrL − and function which is de-
creased towards )~( rrD − and )~var( Lr . 
x*D is function decreased towards the vari-
able )~( rrL − and function which is de-
creased towards )~( rrD − and )~var( Dr . 
Evidence: 
See Freixas and Rochet (2008). 
Preposition 2 shows the behavior of credit 
and savings mobilization as a function of the 
risk of investment returns and risk-free asset. 
Further development can be done by incor-
porating various risk variables such as credit 
recovery rate, exchange rate fluctuations, 
system failure and fraud. 
 
Mechanism of the Banking Market Disci-
pline 
The concept of market discipline mechanism 
is viewed from the model Landskroner and 
Paroush (2008). Assumptions used in the 
model can be given as follows: 
1. Bank with an initial capital (E) is paid by 
the shareholders in exchange for the right 
management and appoints managers. 
2. Equity is the last holder of the claim; he 
obtained a residual value of the company 
only after all obligations to depositors and 
debt holders met. 
3. Constellation of interest rates is normal, in 
the sense that yields smaller savings than the 
risk-free interest rate is smaller than the 
yield loans or 
4. Market discipline occurs through the exis-
tence of the risk premium arising from the 
structure of bank funding, the Deposit (D) 
and equity (E). 
5. Static Analysis is the one period optimiza-
tion. 
6. Bank has the possibility of going bankrupt 
when the bank's equity at end of period (N) 
is negative (<0). 
7. Possibility of bankruptcy is demonstrated 
by a probability function as follows: 
 (6) 
In which θ is the parameter of risk and gov-
ernance of assets while y is assumed to be 
monotonically increasing with property y '> 
0 and y'' <0. 
By assuming as given above, the bank's 
optimization objective function can now be 
formulated as follows: 
  (7) 
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The bank profit is a function of the risk 
(and corporate governance) investment as-
sets through a probability function g (θ), 
which indicates the probability of obtaining 
any level of return that is a function of the 
level of risk taken. Probability function g (θ) 
is monotonically increasing with the prop-
erty g '> 0, g'' <0 and. Market discipline seen 
from the magnitude of the risk components: 
k. Component k is assumed to have a direct 
impact on stock prices and have a positive 
functional form to yield savings. 
0
~ >∂
∂
k
rD
. (8) 
Variable θ, E, W and r is the exogenous 
variable whose value is determined by 7 out 
system optimization. On the other hand, it is 
DLD xkrr ,,~,~  and xL an endogenous variable. 
The solution to the system of equations and 
analysis of comparative static will show sen-
sitivity to changes in endogenous variable 
exogenous variables. Landskroner and 
Paroush (2008) provide some guidance or 
preposition associated with the comparative 
static analysis using the 7 models, namely 
 
Preposition 3 
If the mechanism of transmission of market 
information (shares and deposits) to the 
market discipline is effective, the impact of 
changes in exogenous variables on the risk 
premium is expected to have the algebraic 
sign as follows: 
0;0;0;0 <∂
∂<∂
∂<∂
∂>∂
∂
r
k
W
k
E
kk
θ  (9) 
 
Evidence: 
See Landskroner and Paroush (2008). 
 
Empirical Study 
The empirical studies on the effectiveness of 
market discipline modern countries have 
been long done. Gilbert (1990), for example 
obtained empirical evidence of the existence 
of the signal discipline in the banking sector 
in the United States through the deposit in-
terest rate. Further, a similar study was car-
ried out in several developed countries with 
promising results. There is a possibility of 
market discipline to complement formal 
regulatory functions performed authorities or 
even replace it (Flannery 2001). 
Flannery et al. (2004) also conducted a 
study of a number of the World Bank hold-
ing company's stock price. He found that the 
investors can also provide a signal to the 
market discipline though with a slightly dif-
ferent pattern of non-bank firms. Distinguin 
et al. (2006) found the market variables 
(market-based indicators) such as market 
value of equity has significant explanatory 
ability of the bank probability of having 
problems (distressed banks). Meanwhile, 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001) through a study of 
500 commercial paper interest rate spread 
subordinate find a significant negative re-
sponse from investors over excessive risk-
taking behavior. 
Another research path associated with 
market discipline is to measure the informa-
tion contained in the instrument of securities 
than information from the regulator (in the 
form of announcements or rating of the 
bank). For example, Berger et al. (2001) from 
an analysis of U.S. banks found that the indi-
cator stocks and bonds have higher informa-
tion content than the regulator reports. Simi-
lar findings were obtained by Iannotta (2006) 
from a study of 100 European banks in the 
period 1999 to 2007 indicating that the bond 
spreads contain a hidden information in the 
report that there is no authority. However, the 
information from market instrument is still 
lower than the regulator information obtained 
from the inspection: on-site examination 
(Berger et al. 2000). 
Like the above researchers, Levy-Yeyati 
et al. (2004) conducted a study of the bank-
ing crisis in Argentina in 2000. They found 
that the financial markets are less developed, 
the dominant government ownership in the 
banking system and lack of transparency in 
financial reporting has become a major fac-
tor in the ineffectiveness of market disci-
pline. However, investors and the public can 
provide a very substantial response when 
banks indicated experiencing systematic 
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risk. In other words, market discipline to 
work in the conditions of systematic risk. 
Another study conducted by Ghosh & 
Dash (2004) found support for the effective-
ness of market discipline. Using data from 72 
banks in India in the period 1996-2002, they 
found that depositors "punish" banks that in-
vest the assets that are too risky (excessive risk 
taking). Similar findings were obtained by 
Vives (2006) from the results of his study of 
banking in Latin America and East Asia. 
However, he also argued that the implementa-
tion of market discipline has a trade off for the 
reduced role of bank intermediation. Berger 
and Turk Ariss (2010) find empirical support 
for the role of market discipline in the context 
of developed countries: the European Union 
and the United States. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizunga (2004) 
conducted a study on the impact of the im-
plementation of cross-country deposit guaran-
tee (deposit insurance) to market discipline. 
By using a panel data of banks in 51 coun-
tries in the period 1990-1997, they find that 
deposit insurance has reduced the cost of 
bank interest (this will undermine the influ-
ence of market discipline). Thus, there is an 
increasingly broad scope of the guarantee 
scheme the greater which has negative impact 
on the implementation market discipline. 
A variant of the empirical literature re-
lated to market discipline is done by looking 
at the impact on the stability industry. Such 
an approach was done by Nier (2005). Using 
data from 550 banks in 32 countries opened 
in the period 1994-2000 and the panel logit 
analysis techniques he found that effective 
market discipline gained through increased 
transparency. The better the financial per-
formance of the transparency rules that ap-
plied then the higher the stability of the 
banking industry. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) conducted a 
study of the effect of ownership on risk-
taking behavior of banks as well as financial 
reporting. Regression across units (cross 
section) of the 279 largest banks in 48 coun-
tries showed that risk-taking behavior 
(which is proxied by the z score return of 
assets and capital asset ratio) has a positive 
relationship with ownership concentration. 
The more shares concentrated on a number 
of shareholders, the level of risk taking will 
become higher. There has been a dynamic 
interaction with the regulatory concentration 
stake to risk taking behavior through disclo-
sure of financial information. 
 
Hypothesis 
There are two hypotheses proposed in this 
study as the following. 
a. Public and investors can identify the value 
of a bank (profitability and risk) reasonably 
and provide the relevant signal on factual 
conditions which are owned by the bank 
(disciplining Signal Hypotheses: DSH). 
b. Bank management pays attention to this 
signal and will pursue policies to improve 
public perception and investor (Corrective 
Response Hypotheses: CRH). 
When these two hypotheses are ac-
cepted, it indicates empirical support for the 
influence of market discipline on the forma-
tion of a bank's risk-taking behavior. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
To achieve the research objectives, this 
study used a two-stage empirical design. 
First, this study verified the signal hypothe-
sis empirically by market discipline (Disci-
plining Signal Hypotheses). This study Here 
the researcher perform regression on two 
proxy variables for market discipline and 
control a variety of explanatory variables. 
Two proxy variables are as follows: 
a. Implied Cost of Fund (ICOF), 
b. Changes in stock prices in one semester 
(Market Price Change, MPC), 
c. ICOF proxy is used to verify the DSH in 
regarding that only about 29 of the 120 
banks in Indonesia have an open status. 
After doing an empirical test on DSH, 
the verification of CRH is done. Then it ver-
ify to see whether the proxy value of DSH 
(ICOF and MPC) in the previous period (T-
1) affect bank policies related to one of the 
risk variable during this period (T) as the 
proxies used as risk variables. 
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a. Credit risk, proxied by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (gross non-
performing loans, NPL) 
b. Liquidity risk, proxied by the ratio of 
loans to total deposits (Loan to Deposit Ra-
tio, LDR) 
c. Operational risk, proxied by the ratio of 
operating expenses to total assets (Opera-
tional Cost to Total Assets, OCTA). 
The second stage of the above estima-
tion is done by a variety of variables which 
control the expected impact as business 
prospects, sustainability and macro eco-
nomic conditions. Various empirical 
schemes were also carried out with respect 
to the operation of the Deposit Insurance 
Agency (LPS) starting from the second half 
II of 2005. 
 
Data, Variables, and Econometric Model 
Thirteen variables are used in this study. 
Two variables are used to measure market 
discipline (dependent variable). Four vari-
ables are used to measure risk-taking behav-
ior. Three variables measure aspects of busi-
ness prospects (sustainability) and three 
variables were used as controls macroeco-
nomic conditions. 
The empirical analysis is conducted by 
using data semiannual frequency in the pe-
riod June 2000 to December 2010. There are 
110 banks as the object of study, thus the 
2420 observation. The data related to the 
bank's financial position were obtained from 
a third party (consultant) of Ekofin and Bank 
Indonesia (BI). Macroeconomic data and 
stock prices were obtained through the Cen-
tral Statistics Agency (BPS), BI and 
Bloomberg. 
Definition and calculation of proxies for 
variables can be given as shown in Table 1. 
The empirical test of hypotheses on dis-
ciplinary signal is done through the follow-
ing regression model: 
 (10) 
 
In which , MDit is the vector of market dis-
cipline variable, while RT is the matrix of 
risk behavior variables, PS the matrix vari-
able and sustainability prospects and CV, the 
matrix of control variables. Vector γ, δ, μ 
and η are the coefficients of the relevant 
variable effect. 
When the signal hypothesis of disci-
plines is in effect, the pattern of relationship 
can be expected that is between the depend-
ent variable (MD) and independent variables 
as described in Table 2. 
The empirical test of corrective response 
signal Hypothesis is done by the following 
regression model: 
 (11) 
 
In which, MDit is the indicator of risk-
taking behavior that is the loan (NPL), li-
quidity (LDR), and operation (OCTA) of the 
bank in period j. It also converts it into a 
form MD variable to be relative: comparison 
to the industry. Thus, when the bank man-
ager found the cost of funds and/or share 
price moving dramatically (negatively) than 
the industry, it can be viewed as a pressure 
to make corrections. 
When the hypothesis is true, the correc-
tive response to CRH equation is expected to 
provide an indication of algebra as in Table 3. 
Each hypothesis was tested using panels 
5 regression techniques that are the Pooled 
Panel Data, Fixed Effect, Random Effect, 
Instrumental Variable, and Dynamic Panel 
Data. The above use of estimation tech-
niques is intended to be a robustness test. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Part of the analysis consists of two parts. 
Firstly, the study discusses the descriptive 
statistics of the variables such as the variable 
of cost of funds and market discipline and 
stock prices. Secondly, it describes the re-
sults obtained from the results of the empiri-
cal estimation. Disciplinary signal hypothe-
sis is presented first, followed by a correc-
tive response. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The data has some unusual values or logics. 
This number of the data (degree of freedom) 
is owned by the researcher carried out for 
νημδγ ++++= MEPSRTMD ijjiit
ωμψλφ ++++= − MEPSMDRT
jiit
1
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screening. The screening is done by apply-
ing a set of criteria of variable values that 
are considered plausible. The criteria used 
are as follows: 
1. ICOF is between 0 and 50; 
2. NPL is between 0 and 40; 
3. LDR is between 0 and 150; 
4. OCTA is between 0 and 30; 
5. NIM is under 20; 
6. CAR is between -10 and 50. 
By applying such criteria, the number of 
samples can be reduced from 2420 observa-
tions to 1843 observations. Thus, the de-
scriptive statistics after screening can be 
shown in Table A.1 in Appendices. 
When the analysis used the instrument's 
stock price, the researcher used the data 
from 18 banks that had been opened in the 
period 2000 semester and 2010 second se-
mester. Again, the researcher also applies 
the criteria screening criteria by the previous 
ICOF scheme in which the results can be 
Table 1 
Definition of Research Variables 
 
No. Variable Name Description (Proxy and Notation) 
Market Discipline (MD) 
1 Implied Cost of Fund  Ratio between realized cost of interest towards total DPK 
(ICOF)  
2 Market Price Change  Stock Price changes of the bank in a semester (MPC) 
Risk Taking Behavior (RT) 
3 Asset Size Ability to take risk measured through asset value proxy 
(ASSET) 
4 Credit Risk Credit risk proxied from non performing loan category loan up 
to the total bad debt (Non Performing Loan). Notation: NPL 
5 Interest rate Risk Interest rate risk movement  proxied through ratio of total loan 
towards savings (Loan To Deposit Ratio). Notation: LDR 
6 Operational ratio Other risks proxied by operational cost ratio towards total asset 
(Operation Cost To Total Asset). Notation: OCTA. 
Prospect and Sustainability of a Business (PS) 
7 Net Interest Margin Spread between loan interest rate and savings, counted as  the 
ratio of Interest Income – Interest Cost To Total Productive 
Assets. Notation: NIM 
8 Market Share Market share proxied as the ratio of bank asset towards  total 
industry. Notation: SHARE 
9 Capital ratio Level of capitalization of the bank proxied by  the capital 
ration towards asset according to the risk  of (ATMR, Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Notation: CAR 
Macro Economy (ME) 
10 Economic Growth General economic condition proxied by Gross Domestic 
product (GDP, percentage, Year on Year:YoY). Notation 
GROWTH 
11 Inflation Level Level of Price Changes proxied by the change percentage  
(YoY) Index of consumer price (IHK) . Notation 
INFLATION. 
12 Balance Payment 
Pressure  
General condition of foreign fund in and out the country 
proxied by percentage of yearly depreciation or appreciation 
Notation: DEPR. 
Others 
13 Establishment of 
Saving Guarantee 
Institution  
V Category Variables showing the SGI operation, 1 for period 
of semester 2005 above, and 0 for other condition 
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seen in Table A.2 in Appendices. 
The researcher estimates the market 
discipline mechanism through DSH and 
CRH using the scheme which is taken into 
account for the effects of LPS. In this sec-
tion, the study discusses some interesting 
empirical findings, which can provide an 
idea of how the market discipline mecha-
nism works. 
First, the researcher obtained a fairly 
strong empirical support for the existence of 
disciplinary signal hypothesis (DSH), fund-
ing costs either through instruments and 
stock prices (see Table 3 and 4 in Appendi-
ces). The increase of NPLs risk variable, 
LDR, and OCTA has led to a negative per-
ception on the part of the customers' deposits 
which also lead to the need for an additional 
premium (increase in cost of funds) for the 
bank is in question. This finding is consis-
tent with studies conducted by Gilbert 
(1990) and Flannery (2001) on the U.S. 
banking industries. 
The following empirical finding con-
cerns the exogenous control variables; the 
effect is the strongest signal on the NPL 
Disciplinary followed by LDR, and finally 
OCTA. Depositors and investors are very 
sensitive to the position of bank credit risk 
than if the bank is exposed to interest rate 
risk or operational. This finding is in line 
with the results of studies by Ghosh and 
Dash (2004) on 72 commercial banks in 
India. 
The response variable of share price 
performance relative to market index ap-
pears to show the mechanism of market 
discipline through disciplinary signals. The 
banks have credit risk positions, interest 
rate, and operational higher than its peers 
that tend to experience selling pressure and 
it is higher than the market index. This 
empirical finding is consistent with results 
of studies by Flannery et al. (2004) on 
which banks operate globally and Distin-
guin et al. (2006) on the banks in the 
United States. 
The second, as found in the hypothesis 
of empirical findings, it indicates LPS im-
plementation generally undermines the im-
Table 2 
Estimated Signs of Algebra Disciplinary Signal Hypothesis 
 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variables RT PS ME Others 
ICOF Positive: All Negative: 
All 
Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined 
MPC Negative: All Positive: All Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined. 
 
Table 3 
Estimated Signs of Algebra Corrective Response Hypothesis 
 
  Independent Variables  Dependent 
variables MD-1(ICOF) PS ME Others 
NPL Negative Negative: 
All 
Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined 
LDR Negative Positive: 
All 
Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined 
OCTA Negative Undefined Undefined Undefined 
 MD-1 (MPC) PS ME Others 
NPL Positive Negative: 
All 
Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined 
LDR Positive Positive: 
All 
Positive: GRW 
Negative: INF, EXT 
Undefined 
OCTA Positive Undefined Undefined Undefined 
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plementation of market discipline (see Table 
A.3 and A.4). The algebra sign of the inter-
action variable towards the application of 
LPS with variable risk on scheme funding 
cost is negative and significant. The pres-
ence of LPS has reduced the risk premium 
demanded by the customers and investors 
against the risk which is taken by a bank. 
The empirical result is consistent with the 
findings by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizunga 
(2005) that did a cross-country study. 
The presence of LPS also has an impact 
on the risk compensation for investors. The 
coefficient of the interaction and share price 
performance relative to market with LPS 
marker is negative (see Table A.3 and A.4 
in Appendices). In other words, the pres-
ence of LPS reduces the incentive to sell 
the bank's stock price (relative to the mar-
ket) if the bank detected an increase in posi-
tions of risk: credit, interest rate and opera-
tional. 
In this case, the researcher relates these 
empirical findings with those by Berger and 
Davies (2000) and De Young et al. (1998). 
They conducted a study of banks in devel-
oped countries and found that the content of 
the information held by regulators is con-
sidered more valuable than market informa-
tion. 
For that reason, the presence of LPS 
(which is considered as an additional regula-
tor against Bank of Indonesia) provides bet-
ter signals of the presence of extraction and 
processing information. 
Third, the general hypothesis of correc-
tive responses empirically supports but it is 
weaker than the signal hypothesis discipline. 
Thus, this is in line with that obtained either 
by using the instrument cost of funds (ICOF) 
and stock prices (MPC), see Table A.5 to 
A.10 in Appendices. 
LDR risk variable is in response to the 
development of the individual bank's cost of 
funds (relative to industry) that is positive. 
This is on the contrary to the hypothesis that 
is in negative direction: when the bank finds 
itself paying a higher cost of funds relative 
(to industry), the bank attempt to reduce such 
risk by reducing position LDR. With a posi-
tive coefficient, it means that the banks in-
crease the LDR position if the cost of funds 
increases. 
In general, the arguments can be put for-
ward that this phenomenon is related to the 
business motivation: profit maximization. 
To cover the increased cost of funds, the 
banks should undertake income generation. 
This is achieved primarily through the ex-
pansion of credit, as loans to borrowers are 
one of the bank's main sources of income. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that the increase 
in cost of funds led to the LDR. The impor-
tance of business motivation is also indi-
cated by the magnitude and significance 
level of the variable coefficient of NIM is 
higher. 
A better support for CRH can be seen 
through NPL response. In the majority of the 
estimator, the coefficient is negative in line 
with the hypothesis and very significant. 
Nevertheless the invisible LPS scheme im-
plementation affects the market discipline 
mechanism. The algebra sign and signifi-
cance levels obtained were not conclusive. 
The empirical support for the risk vari-
able response to the movement of funds 
OCTA does not look strong. The majority of 
the coefficient has a positive algebraic sign 
which is not in line with the hypothesis. Be-
sides that, the significance obtained is also 
very low. The empirical conclusion is not 
changed by including the effects of LPS. 
Yet, it is slightly different result as ob-
tained from the estimation of the instru-
ment's stock price. The relative share price 
performance is worse than the index which 
is considered as a negative signal by the 
bank management related to interest rate risk 
position. Every decrease of 1% the stock 
price is more drastic than the market index 
will be accompanied with a decrease of 
0.012% s LDR/d 0.036%. The LPS scheme 
implementation does not give results as ex-
pected. The obtained algebraic sign is nega-
tive, which is not consistent with the hy-
pothesis and the significance level is very 
low. 
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Next is the cost of funds scheme, CRH 
using the relative share price movements 
that are not all to have too strong empirical 
support for a particular risk variable OCTA. 
Coefficient values obtained with or without 
ignoring the influence of LPS generally not 
convergent and have a low level of signifi-
cance. 
Fourth, there are several interesting em-
pirical findings related to the use of control 
variables. In the scheme of using instru-
ments DSH funding costs, bank size variable 
seems to have a negative algebraic sign 
(with various estimators) as well as a high 
level of significance. The algebraic signs do 
not undergo significant change when vari-
ables are taken into account in the estimation 
of the effects of LPS. In other words, the 
impact of bank size is empirically robust. 
The above findings indicate that banks 
with larger size have advantages in terms of 
fund pricing (cheaper). It can be derived 
from the influence of the scope of services 
and products (such as ATM, hospitality, 
comfort, and so on), the benefits for the cus-
tomers gained dealing with the big banks. 
However, especially for the banking indus-
tries, this effect is very likely due to the 
safety of funds. If the bank is bigger, then 
the probability of the bank to fail will be 
smaller. This phenomenon is known as too 
big too fail. 
Other interesting findings were from the 
algebraic sign and significance of macro-
economic variables: economic growth and 
exchange rate depreciation. Both of these 
variables have a negative sign and highly 
significant. This is in contrast with the hy-
pothesis arguing that are when prepared at 
the beginning of algebraic sign for the two 
variables, it will be positive. 
An argument that can be put forward 
explaining this empirical finding is the envi-
ronment and the dynamics of macroeco-
nomic management, the better. The macro-
economic theory (Phillips curve) states the 
irreversibility is between growth and infla-
tion rate (which means also to the impact of 
interest rate). The higher the economic 
growth rate will be higher inflation, with the 
assumption that real interest rates will en-
courage certain high interest rate (nominal). 
The data period of 2000-2010 shows the 
improvement in macroeconomic manage-
ment. Band of Indonesia (BI) managed to 
build credibility so that from year to year the 
inflation can be maintained at a low level. 
Beside, the historical performance affects 
expectations so the rate of inflation in the 
next period can also be maintained low. 
Thus, the Indonesian economic environment 
is characterized by high economic growth 
with the rate of inflation (equilibrium which 
is diminishing. 
The interest rate which is declined also 
increases the prospects of interest payments 
and repayments of customer loans. Conse-
quently, the prospects of credit risk and de-
positors request for risk premium also de-
cline. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
The estimation results provide some findings 
as follows: 
1. DSH has a fairly strong empirical support 
either by using instruments scheme funding 
costs and stock price. In other words, de-
positors and investors monitoring the bank's 
risk position and provides a signal on the 
development of which is considered nega-
tive. 
2. CRH gained empirical support is weaker. 
In the empirical scheme using ICOF, bank 
manager looks observe discipline with cor-
rection signals via LDR. Yet, the empirical 
scheme using stock prices, bank managers 
appears more to have used the NPL correc-
tion tool. 
3. The LPS (Saving Guarantee Institu-
tion/Underwriters) undermines market disci-
pline mechanism as seen in DSH. The cus-
tomer and investors response to the growing 
intensity can decrease the bank's risk position 
after application of the LPS. 
4. However, the impact of LPS cannot be 
identified as a significant influence on 
CRH. The response of bank managers be-
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fore and after the application of LPS even 
did not have a statistically significant dif-
ference. 
Some additional interesting findings are 
found especially for those which are related 
to the behavior of the main control variable, 
bank size and macroeconomic variables. 
Therefore, the banks with large scale have 
added value in pricing funds and they are 
very likely due to the influence of too big to 
fail. 
This study has revealed some interesting 
evidences such as in the mechanism of mar-
ket discipline in the banking industries. There 
are policy implications that can be followed 
up as follows: 
1. It is requested that the ability of holders of 
bank claims be maintained in which they are 
the customers and investors in the signaling 
discipline. The implementation is that the 
LPS have a negative impact on the existing 
process. Thus, it needs a review of the busi-
ness and operational aspects of LPS-expected 
to be have a negative impact on the imple-
mentation of market discipline. 
2. The estimation results show a weak sup-
port for CRH. The authorities can improve 
the response function by supporting correc-
tive disciplinary signals. The increase in cost 
of funds and/or abnormal stock price decline 
and it may be early signs for the problem at 
a bank. Bank supervisors could verify that 
the credibility of the signal discipline, which 
was originally given by the market, can in-
crease. 
3. Supervision and management of the con-
dition of a healthy industry need to be main-
tained not only for the sake of stability but 
also the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
The study also shows that the cost of funds 
is one of the canals that are used in the im-
plementation of market discipline. On the 
other hand the cost of funds is also a channel 
of monetary policy. Thus, the implementa-
tion of monetary policy should be conducted 
with respect to a condition which is mainly 
related to the implementation of market dis-
cipline. 
This study provides some open similar 
research direction for future development. 
Some suggestions are as the following: 
1. It deals with the use of an integrated bank 
risk indicators. The study uses separate indi-
cators: credit, interest rate and operational. 
Such an approach raises particular problems 
associated with the estimation of: identifica-
tion and possible simultaneity. 
2. Empirical research design is static and one-
way. Strategic paradigm can be done for ex-
ample by using game theory can be used to 
construct the research framework and empiri-
cal design better. 
3. The indicators are used as LDR, NPL, 
CAR these are such sufficient statistic com-
monly used. Probably, there are many other 
indicators that are not included but highly 
influential on the study results. Indicators 
such as franchise value, the soundness of 
bank regulators and market valuations ver-
sion will give you a deeper insight to the 
process of market discipline mechanisms in 
Indonesia. 
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